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PROMOTING INNOVATION WHILE PREVENTING 
DISCRIMINATION: POLICY GOALS FOR THE SCORED 
SOCIETY 
Frank Pasquale* & Danielle Keats Citron** 
Professor Zarsky’s response1 is an erudite and thoughtful analysis of 
the discrimination concerns raised by our article, The Scored Society.2 
We particularly appreciate his connection of themes in our article with 
literature on discrimination law. This historical awareness and 
theoretical sophistication demonstrates the deep continuity between our 
concerns and those of other legal scholars. 
Professor Zarsky has led us to realize that there are in fact several 
normative theories of jurisprudence supporting our critique of the scored 
society, which complement the social theory and political economy 
presented in our article. In this response, we clarify our 
antidiscrimination argument while showing that is only one of many 
bases for the critique of scoring practices. The concerns raised by Big 
Data may exceed the capacity of extant legal doctrines. Addressing the 
potential injustice may require the hard work of legal reform. 
Before responding, though, we should acknowledge Professor 
Zarsky’s contributions to the field, and explain how we believe our work 
advances inquiry along some of the trails he has blazed with his 
insightful analyses of data mining, privacy, and information law 
generally. 
Professor Zarsky has done a great deal to explore the legal problems 
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thoughtful reply and innovative work, to Mallory Gitt, Maureen Johnston, Jessica Knowles, and 
their colleagues at the Washington Law Review for their terrific editing, and to Professor Ryan Calo 
for his insights and support. 
1. Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375 
(2014). 
2. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
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raised by the proliferation of networked identities and selves. We are all 
aware of the freedoms and dangers posed by pseudonyms, anonymous 
handles, and multiple roles online.3 Viewed in light of Professor 
Zarsky’s proposals about traceable anonymity to ensure accountability in 
a digital age, one can think of the scores explored in our article as deeply 
connected to those concerns: quantified identities imposed on 
individuals, often without their consultation, consent, or even awareness. 
An attention economy has gradually developed on the internet, as 
companies collect information about the habits and demographics of 
those who visit their websites. Unlike the old broadcast model of simply 
exchanging programming content for (an easily avoided) obligation to 
watch commercials, the new online data collectors enjoy far greater 
powers to monitor the behavior and actions of users and to influence 
their online experience and reputation. The skillful use of that data is a 
large part of the success of online behemoths and is increasingly driving 
decisionmaking at companies ranging from banks to retailers. 
But data collection and analysis raises serious concerns. Data 
collection practices range from the careful to the careless. The tradeoff 
between checking accuracy and speedy production can easily tilt toward 
the latter as competition increases.4 Once primarily directed at 
marketing, data collection practices now figure into employment and 
credit opportunities.5 The companies’ digital stockpiles would delight a 
new Stasi or J. Edgar Hoover. Assurances to customers that data are 
anonymized mean little without audits—which are nonexistent for most 
firms, and rare and often cursory even when required. Should a company 
that observes a customer looking at a $10,000 ring on one site use that 
information to allow others to systematically raise prices for the 
customer on the assumption that he or she is wealthy? 
What self-help measures can (and should) consumers take as they are 
observed online? Can contract and tort law address all of the potential 
violations of privacy that occur due to interferences with our settled 
expectations about how our data is used? Can law address the harms 
3. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 27–28, 57–62, 222–25 (2014) 
(exploring the promise and perils of online anonymity, including cyber harassment, and calling for 
anonymity as a default privilege that can be lost). 
4.  Natasha Singer, When Your Data Wanders to Places You’ve Never Been, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
2013, at BU3; Shannon Pettypiece & Jordan Robertson, Did You Know You Had Diabetes? It’s All 
Over the Internet, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2014, 1:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
09-11/how-big-data-peers-inside-your-medicine-chest.html. 
5. Frank Pasquale, Op-Ed., The Dark Market for Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2014, at 
A27. 
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associated with data leaks due to insecure systems?6 The collection of 
vast reservoirs of data raises difficult questions across the range of 
public and private, and statutory and common, law. 
Professor Zarsky’s essay Privacy and Data Collection in Virtual 
Worlds was an early effort to tackle these problems.7 The term “virtual 
world” is usually associated with game-like activity in venues like 
Second Life or World of Warcraft. But the metaphor of the virtual world 
helps enrich our understanding of the degrees of freedom available to the 
legal system as it addresses questions like privacy and identity online. 
Professor Zarsky highlighted the vast extent of personal information that 
can be collected in virtual worlds. He discussed the heightened level of 
surveillance prevalent in the online environment. In our era of pervasive 
surveillance, tracking, and the internet of things, that world is our world, 
and its most gifted explicators have given us important insights into how 
pervasive data-gathering and processing should be governed.8 
While many laissez-faire commenters have claimed that users can 
“take or leave” participation in virtual worlds if they find such 
surveillance oppressive, Professor Zarsky early on realized how many 
important activities are migrating to these virtual spaces and how 
individual user decisions are constrained. For example, someone opting 
out of Second Life, and creating their own “Third Life,” might well find 
that none of his friends follow him to his own virtual world, and that the 
creators of Second Life sue for copyright and trademark infringement to 
the extent the newer virtual world mimics their own. Those trying to 
defect to the alternative social networks Google+ and Ello have 
experienced this coordination problem directly: maybe they and some 
enterprising friends establish a presence there, only to find that ninety 
percent of the rest of their social network is too busy or uninterested to 
join them. Technical and practical challenges to creating a user 
experience sufficiently similar to attract users of the Second Life 
interface, while sufficiently different to avoid infringing intellectual 
property, may well be insuperable. 
To deal with these dynamics, Professor Zarsky has recognized that 
6. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and 
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007). 
7. Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Data Collection in Virtual Worlds, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, 
GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 217 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006). 
8. Bernard E. Harcourt, Digital Security in the Expository Society: Spectacle, Surveillance, and 
Exhibition in the Neoliberal Age of Big Data 13 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-404, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2455223; see also David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative 
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013). 
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TOSs and EULAs are, by and large, contracts of adhesion, and that only 
a public law solution can address the imbalances inevitable in these 
contracts, which in most cases amount to little more than private 
legislation of terms by the dominant party. We agree. Regulatory 
initiatives are essential to guard consumers who can hardly anticipate all 
potential uses of data on their own. 
Professor Zarsky’s attention to threats to the sensitive online ecology 
of social software continued in his work Law and Online Social 
Networks.9 He analyzed the positive and negative social effects of 
interactions in these environments. Professor Zarsky is one of the first 
scholars to notice the importance of gaming in social networks—efforts 
to manipulate or fake the bonds of trust that create social capital and 
cooperation. We believe that, unregulated, scoring could lead to exactly 
the same issues: people pervasively manipulating their own identities to 
gain monetary or other advantages.10 
Professor Zarsky has balanced two sets of competing demands on 
legal scholars in technologically cutting-edge fields. While a principle of 
subsidiarity recommends market- and contract-based remedies for many 
wrongs that can happen on these networks, problems of “astroturf” (i.e., 
commodified and artificial support) and manipulation can probably only 
be addressed via dedicated entities with the technical expertise to patrol 
against them. One must simultaneously understand and engage with new 
technical developments unanticipated by lawmakers, and try to identify 
the issues that will recur as future developments supersede present 
controversies. Professor Zarsky masterfully balanced these imperatives 
in Law and Online Social Networks, both comprehending the new 
opportunities for distributed information creation generated by social 
networks, and isolating the core issues of gaming and authentication that 
will prove nettlesome in virtually any foreseeable instantiation of social 
software. The law of consumer scoring still has to grapple with both 
issues.11 
As reflected in his response to us, Professor Zarsky recognizes the 
limits of legal solutions to the challenges of the scored society. In his 
9. Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of 
User-Generated Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 741 (2008). 
10. Frank Pasquale, Facebook’s Model Users, NEW CRITICALS (July 6, 2014), 
http://www.newcriticals.com/facebooks-model-users/print. 
11. PAM DIXON & ROBERT GELLMAN, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, THE SCORING OF AMERICA: 
HOW SECRET CONSUMER SCORES THREATEN YOUR PRIVACY AND YOUR FUTURE (2014), available 
at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_America_Ap 
ril2014_fs.pdf. 
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reflections on anonymity, transparency, and pseudonymity in Thinking 
Outside the Box,12 he meticulously detailed the inevitable tradeoffs that 
occur online in tracking individual action—tradeoffs policymakers will 
have to consider as they weigh the virtues and vices of requiring better 
data collection practices by scorers. With this appreciation of Professor 
Zarsky’s work, we have now set the stage for responding on mutually 
agreeable normative foundations to the incisive analysis he has offered 
to enrich our own. 
I. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IS IMPERILED DUE TO THE 
SCORING OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION 
In his response, Professor Zarsky focuses on how scoring may have a 
negative impact on traditionally protected groups, such as racial 
minorities.13 He observes that, at least in the United States, the Supreme 
Court is not disposed to include many more such groups under the 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Existing state constitutional 
law and statutory law, however, is not so confined. Civil rights 
protections can and do reach newly recognized disadvantaged groups, 
including sexual minorities.14 We look forward to learning more about 
how other countries might take a more flexible approach. 
However, our concerns about scoring extend beyond the protections 
afforded traditionally disadvantaged groups from a constitutional or 
statutory perspective. The key to understanding the menace of scoring in 
a modern, Big Data economy is the volume, velocity, and variety of 
information that could be fed into a score.15 The legal academy is still 
catching up to the shocking empirical findings of security researchers, 
privacy law scholars, and computer scientists. To take only one example, 
Pam Dixon and Robert Gellman have unearthed thousands of scoring 
12. Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and 
Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems in Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991 (2004). 
13. For other thoughtful work on the potential for antidiscrimination law in troubling uses of Big 
Data, see Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact (Oct. 19, 2014) 
(unpublished), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899. 
14. Some states extend civil rights protections not only to racial and religious minorities but also 
to people targeted due to their gender and sexual orientation. See, e.g., Kathleen W. Mikkelson, 
California’s Civil and Criminal Laws Pertaining to Hate Crimes, OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL., 
http://oag.ca.gov/civil/htm/laws (updated Feb. 25, 1999). 
15. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING 
VALUES 4 (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy 
_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf. 
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systems. Outsiders have no idea what is going into many of them.16 And 
yet these scores could become decisive in contexts ranging from 
employment to insurance to marketing and beyond. 
Our article was an effort to challenge the presumption of benign, 
targeted scoring. The Big Data economy is premised on the 
accumulation of massive amounts of data, and it is all but certain that 
some of it will be sensitive data or will be pieced together to make 
derogatory inferences. Just as the ever-declining price of surveillance 
and the pervasiveness of sensor networks have revolutionized Fourth 
Amendment law, the very cheapness of data requires us to rethink 
privacy law. Professor Zarsky mentions the possibility that there are 
already lists of Muslim and Jewish individuals in commercial databases. 
Add to that lists of gay individuals, Democrats, Republicans, Socialist 
Party supporters, breast cancer survivors, Alcohol Anonymous 
participants, fans of mixed martial arts, Krav Maga members, violent 
video game addicts, and literally millions of other categories. 
It is one thing to go through life with a sense that authorities may be 
able to scrutinize all of one’s data in the context of criminal 
investigations or intelligence gathering. We addressed the deep concerns 
such surveillance raises in our article Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus17—a piece that the Snowden 
revelations now show to be prescient in terms of the dark possibilities it 
raised but that we could not entirely confirm in 2011. With the leaks of 
governmental insiders, we have proof that pervasive, continuous, and 
totalizing surveillance is the order of the day. 
That said, it is quite another matter, and in many respects the more 
chilling extension of surveillance, to understand that one’s data is being 
processed in literally thousands of scores that cannot be reviewed, 
understood, or challenged. “Do I dare retweet the #Ferguson hashtag, 
lest some future employer score that as an indicator of rebelliousness?” a 
person may reasonably ask herself. “Are there risks in calling Edward 
Snowden a whistleblower, lest that suggest an anti-government agenda?” 
is another question that is reasonable for social media participants to ask 
themselves. 
Until we have much better knowledge of scoring practices, and quite 
possibly until we have law explicitly restricting employers from basing 
hiring, firing, and promotion decisions on generalized assumptions based 
16. DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 11, at 7. 
17. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic 
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2010–2011). 
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on political expression, a troubling burden on expressive freedom will 
persist. 
Whatever the current state of First Amendment doctrine, a regime of 
total surveillance undermines the free development of personality upon 
which free expression depends.18 The power to watch is the power to 
attack, embarrass, and destroy reputations. As Professor Daniel J. Solove 
shows, privacy is not just a problem of concealing isolated facts.19 Of 
great concern is the collection and analysis of a critical mass of data. Our 
lives are starting to become an open book for those powerful or rich 
enough to score our profiles.  
We need to think of privacy as being as much a vindication of our 
First Amendment as our Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.20 Professor 
Marc Jonathan Blitz has explored the intersection of free speech and 
privacy values.21 Will individuals hesitate to join mental illness support 
groups on Facebook, once they are aware that an ever-growing array of 
body or mind scores may be used against her? Will they refrain from 
“liking” fringe political groups on Facebook, once they realize that their 
affiliations on social media are ending up in scores that can have a 
detriment on their careers? 
The technological tools for matching digital records are staggering. 
State restrictions on the use of that data (and scores based on it) can be 
an important step toward giving individuals a chance to form and 
express opinions and affiliations in peace—without fearing an endlessly 
ramifying series of classifications made and opportunities possibly 
denied, on account of faceless and secretive data miners. 
II. PRIVACY AND POSITIVE-SUM INNOVATION: MUTUALLY 
REINFORCING GOALS 
A balanced and thoughtful reconciliation of the interests of data 
brokers, data subjects, scorers, and users of data and scores is important. 
We do not want to unduly burden a nascent industry. But we should also 
realize that privacy and innovation are mutually reinforcing constructs 
when, as in our case, critical aspects of privacy protection require the 
18. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012) (on dangers of modulation). 
19. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY (2011). 
20. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 112 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 
114–15 (2007). 
21. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First 
Amendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 359 (2010–2011). 
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validation of the data used. In reliable Big Data science, researchers 
invest a great deal of time and effort in cleaning up data, assuring that it 
is actually accurate and verifiable.22 In commercial contexts where 
opportunities and livelihoods are at stake, the case for assuring data 
integrity applies a fortiori. 
Moreover, there is now an opportunity to shape scoring systems 
toward positive-sum innovation, as opposed to ever more baroque 
strategies of discrimination. Pam Dixon has accused firms of using 
“vulnerability-based marketing” to target consumers.23 In one disturbing 
example, marketers were urged to place ads at times of the day when 
women felt worst about themselves.24 In another, consumers were 
unaware that lead generators for credit were selling their names to the 
“highest bidder,” including firms more than ready to charge near-
usurious interest rates.25 The U.S. Public Interest Research Group (U.S. 
PIRG) correctly argues: 
[S]ome of the non-transparent, deceptive pages you are led to on 
the Internet when you type “I need a loan,” may appear to be 
lenders, but aren’t. These websites are actually “lead 
generators,” that ask you a few questions to determine your 
value and then auction you off to the highest bidder, often an 
online payday lender or for-profit school. Lead generators are 
the target of numerous enforcement inquiries, including by New 
York. . . . [I]f the protections offered by a regulated prescreening 
system for financial marketing are diluted by a switch to scores 
generated using largely unregulated Internet algorithms created 
through the sharing of cookies and all these other tracking bits 
between and among a vast interconnected network of business-
to-business firms that consumers don’t know about or do 
business with, consumers will be harmed.26 
22. Steve Lohr, For Data Scientists, “Janitor Work” Is Hurdle to Insights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2014, at B4.  
23. See WPF’s Data Broker Testimony Results in New Congressional Letters to Data Brokers 
about Vulnerability-Based Marketing, WORLD PRIVACY F. (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2014/02/wpfs-data-broker-testimony-results-in-new-
congressional-letters-to-data-brokers-regarding-vulnerability-based-marketing/.  
24. Lucia Moses, Marketers Should Take Note of When Women Feel Least Attractive: What 
Messages to Convey and When to Send Them, ADWEEK (Oct. 2, 2013, 6:44 AM), 
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/marketers-should-take-note-when-women-feel-
least-attractive-152753. 
25. Ed Mierzwinski, We Join FTC Event on Big Data E-Scores, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND (Mar. 
19, 2014), http://www.uspirgedfund.org/blogs/eds-blog/usp/we-join-ftc-event-big-data-e-scores.  
26. Id.; see also Ed Mierzwinski & Jeff Chester, Selling Consumers Not Lists: The New World of 
Digital Decision-Making and the Role of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 46 SUFFOLK L. REV. 845, 
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The National Consumer Law Center has concluded that, at least so far, 
Big Data has been a “big disappointment” for scoring creditworthiness.27 
We also should be worried about misdirection of the innovation of 
scoring in the employment context—particularly if firms can effectively 
hide misconduct via scores. Existing laws prohibit some discriminatory 
uses of the data. For example, an employer cannot fire workers simply 
because they have an illness. But Big Data methods are able to predict 
diabetes from a totally innocuous data set (including items like eating 
habits, drugstore visits, magazine subscriptions, and the like). And the 
analyst involved, whether inside or outside the firm, could easily mask 
the use of health-predictive information. 
For example, a firm could conclude a worker is likely to be diabetic 
and that she is likely to be a “high cost worker” given the significant 
monthly costs of diabetic medical care. Given the proprietary nature of 
the information involved, the most the firm is going to tell the fired (or 
unhired) worker is the end result: the data predicted that her cost to the 
firm was likely to be greater than the value she produced. Most of the 
time, companies need not even offer that rationale. Unexplained and 
unchallengeable, Big Data becomes a star chamber. 
We do not have to put up with this stigmatic profiling. State 
legislatures should require employers to reveal to employees all the 
databases of information used to make judgments about them. If we do 
not get that access, we may never know why key decisions are made. 
And secrecy is a discriminator’s best friend: unknown unfairness can 
never be challenged, let alone corrected.28 Without mandating privacy-
respecting innovation, new technology can be abused in order to hide 
(and ultimately promote) discrimination, rather than to promote truly 
productive innovation. 
846 (2013). 
27. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BIG DATA: A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT FOR SCORING CONSUMER 
CREDIT RISK (2014), available at http://www.nclc.org/issues/big-data.html. 
28. It is already difficult to challenge discrimination in hiring practices, for example. The 
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case where Abercrombie & Fitch refused to hire a 
young Muslim woman because her hijab did not comport with the company’s “Look Policy.” The 
Tenth Circuit held that even though the woman would have been entitled to a religious 
accommodation under Title VII, the company’s decision not to hire her did not violate the law 
because she never provided explicit notice that she would require such an accommodation. See 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3089 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 14-86). 
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III. CALIBRATING A POLICY RESPONSE 
Professor Zarsky is correct to say that the scope and level of 
protections afforded to individuals should vary depending on the degree 
of harm suffered. He raises important empirical questions about the level 
of harm that we should expect in areas like marketing and insurance. 
The policy response should also be calibrated with respect to 
characteristics of the scoring systems at issue. 
Consider, for instance, the following chart: 
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The primary targets for legal reform should be the systems associated 
with the boxes in the upper, left-hand corner in the chart above. The 
lower, right-hand corner brings us closer to a zone of technological due 
process. There is a far greater chance of competition in scenarios 4, 8, 
12, and 16 than when some critical aspect of the scoring process is kept 
secret. But even if multiple open systems are competing, we should still 
have some concerns if, as in scenario 4, they generate unrevisable 
judgments, and refuse to open themselves up to the possibility of reform 
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in response to the concerns of scored individuals. 
IV. PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS 
We should also note that Professor Zarsky does assume away some of 
the problems that worried us.29 He assumes that scores “are premised 
upon the individuals’ previous behaviors, rely upon non-spurious 
correlations between individual attributes and problematic behaviors the 
process is trying to predict. (A default, a risk, or poor work performance 
are some key examples).”30 
However, we are concerned about many situations where scores are 
premised on false or distorted accounts of individual behavior. Consider 
two different examples. Let’s first assess credit reports. Millions of 
Americans have errors on their credit reports. Credit reporting is one of 
the most highly regulated, perhaps the most highly regulated, data 
gathering used for scoring. In nearly all other types of scoring, 
individuals do not know that the scoring is done, how the data is 
gathered, what data is fed into the relevant algorithms, the nature of 
these algorithms, or the effect of the scoring.31 
Now, let’s turn to analytics firms that crunch data to search for and 
assess talent in particular fields.32 Remarkable Hire scores a job 
candidate’s talents by looking at how others rate his or her online 
contributions.33 Talent Bin and Gild create lists of potential hires based 
on online data.34 Big-name companies like Facebook, Wal-Mart, and 
Amazon use these technologies to find and recruit job candidates.35 Will 
algorithms give high scores to individuals who have been harassed 
online with defamation, threats, and the posting of nude photos that have 
either been stolen from their online accounts or exposed in violation of 
their trust? Will they identify harassed individuals as top picks for 
employment if those targeted individuals have withdrawn from online 
life? Will they discount online abuse so that victims can be evaluated on 
their merits rather than the falsehoods and privacy invasions spread by 
their harassers? One can only guess the answers to these questions, but 
29. Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1383 (“[T]he following discussion is premised upon several non-
trivial assumptions regarding the scoring process.”).  
30. Id. 
31. See DIXON & GELLMAN, supra note 11. 
32. Matt Richtel, I Was Discovered By An Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2013, at BU1. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
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our bet is that the falsehoods will hold sway. 
Thus, one of our key policy proposals: those harboring significant 
amounts of data ought to have some certified indication of its 
provenance. Such certifications should be regularly audited. Data should 
not be allowed to persist without certification of its provenance and 
accuracy. Until those types of protection are in place, it is in the state’s 
interest to tightly regulate the transfer of health data, much of which the 
state itself required to be created. 
Professor Zarsky also assumes that “the scoring schemes structured 
by statisticians in the back office are indeed followed to a tee by those in 
the field.”36 Unfortunately, if the U.S. experience is any indication, 
precisely the opposite may often be the case. As one finance expert has 
observed, “the more complex the algorithm, the more opportunities it 
provides to the salespeople to ‘game’ and arbitrage the system in order 
to commit fraud.”37 Promoted as a road to opportunity, the aspiration to 
price credit according to scores has had a darker side. Abuses quickly 
piled up, as “some large financial institutions peddled mortgages to 
people who could not possibly pay the monthly rates.”38 Subprime-
structured finance generated enormous fees for middlemen and those 
with “big short” positions, while delivering financial ruin to many end-
purchasers of mortgage-backed securities and millions of homebuyers.39 
In conclusion, we are happy to have had this opportunity to further 
develop and clarify our views in response to Professor Zarsky. His work 
has inspired important research in cyberlaw. We take his 
recommendations seriously as we and other scholars pursue a research 
agenda to address Big Data’s perils for disadvantaged groups.  
 
36. Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1384. 
37. Ashwin Parameswaran, How to Commit Fraud and Get Away With It: A Guide for CEOs, 
MACRORESILIENCE (Dec. 4, 2013, 4:19 PM), http://www.macroresilience.com/2013/12/04/how-to-
commit-fraud-and-get-away-with-it-a-guide-for-ceos/. 
38. MARGARET ATWOOD, PAYBACK: DEBT AND THE SHADOW SIDE OF WEALTH 8 (2008). 
39. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010); JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: 
HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME 
MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS (2014); Robert Brenner, What Is Good for Goldman Sachs Is 
Good for America: The Origins of the Current Crisis (2009), available at 
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0sg0782h. 
 
                                                     
